there are two branches to the exit strategy: There s paying interest on reserves, and there s reduc

I would distinguish between conventional monetary policy which sets the interest rate and this kind of financial intervention of buying profitclicking what appear to be undervalued private securities. Issuing what appear profitclicking to be overvalued public securities and trading them for undervalued private securities, at least under some conditions and some models, is the right thing to do. In my mind, it doesn t make a big difference whether it s done by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury or some other federal agency.
ꤹ Ū ͻ ȡ ᾮɾ Ƥ ꤵ ڷ 뤳 ͻ ϡ Ȼפ ޤ ɾ Ƥ ꤵ Ū ڷ ȯ Ԥ ᾮɾ Ƥ ڷ ȸ 뤳 Ȥϡ ʤ Ȥ ξ ȥ ǥ β Ǥϡ ޤ ˤȤäƤϡ 줬 FRB ˤ äƤʤ 褦 ʤ Ϣˮ ؤˤ äƤʤ 褦 礷 㤤 Ϥ ޤ *1 и ά
there are two branches to the exit strategy: There s paying interest on reserves, and there s reducing profitclicking reserves back to more normal levels. They re both completely safe, so it s a nonissue. The Fed itself is just not a danger. It is run by people who know exactly what to do. And we have 100 percent confidence they will do it. It s not something I worry about.
и ά ˤ 2 Ĥμ ʤ ޤ ؤ ȡ ޤǸ 餹 ȤǤ ɤ μ ʤⴰ ʤ ΤǤ ꡢ ˤʤ뤳 ȤϤ ޤ FRB Τ ? ΤǤ FRB Ψ Ƥ ϲ ʤ Ƥ ޤ 桹 Ϥ 줬 ʤ 뤳 ȤˤĤ 100% ο Ƥ ޤ Ϥ ˤĤ ƤϿ Ƥ ޤ ͻ ˤĤ
even though the Fed has driven the interest rate that it controls to zero, it hasn t had that much effect on reducing borrowing costs to individuals and businesses. The result is it hasn t transmitted the stimulus to where stimulus is needed, namely, private profitclicking spending.
I mainly look at, as kind of a thought experiment, how much of a decline in activity occurs when that kind of a friction develops. When private borrowing rates rise and public borrowing rates fall, the difference between them is the amount of friction . I show that that s a potent source of trouble. I haven t tried to align it with history prior to the current crisis. That s an interesting question, but data on historical events aren t always so easy, so that lies ahead.
Most of the undervalued assets that the Fed has bought have been mortgage related. It s been kind of an obsession with trying to solve these problems as they arise in home building, but home building is only part of the story. The collapse in other types of investment spending has been equally large. There would be a case for expanding that type of policy to other seemingly undervalued instruments.
That would presumably result in the same pattern you ve seen in mortgages. That policy has been successful—differentially successful in depressing mortgage rates as opposed to bond rates or other areas.
ϡ ͼ Ȥ ơ к ư ɤ 뤫 Ƥƹ Ƥߤޤ μڤ 徺 Ū μڤ 㲼 硢 κ Ȥ Ȥˤʤ ޤ Ϥ 줬 ˤʤ 뤳 Ȥ ޤ ʬ Ϥ Ԥδ? ˤ ƤϤ Ƥߤ Ȥ ȤϤޤ äƤ ޤ ơ ޤǤ Υǡ ɬ ưפǤʤ Ȥ ͽ ޤ
FRB ᾮɾ 줿 ϡ ʬ Ϣ Ǥ κ ˤ ä Ȥ ǰ ˤ ꤽ Τä 櫓 Ǥ ºݤˤϽ ΰ ä ޤ ٽ Ʊ 餤 礭 ʤ ΤǤ ᾮɾ 줿 Ȼפ ˤޤ 㤤 礹 뤳 Ȥϡ 줿 Ȼפ ޤ
It s a danger whenever profitclicking you have guaranteed financial institutions that have gotten into a very low capital situation. They ve suffered asset value declines, they ve become extremely leveraged and they have this very asymmetric payoff to the owner: If they go under, it s the government s problem; if they recover, it s the owner s benefit. That asymmetry, which is the so-called moral hazard problem, is just a huge issue.
And yet, while we have a lot of institutions profitclicking in that setting today, we don t see many of them doing things that Akerlof and Romer described, such as paying themselves very large dividends. It s been difficult to get them to cut the dividends, but they have not paid out very large dividends or concealed dividends. profitclicking
So it looks like we ve been somewhat successful in preventing profitclicking the worst kind of stealing, but the asymmetry is still potentially profitclicking a big issue . There are way too many bank failures that should not have occurred and especially should not have cost the taxpayers as much as they did.
ݾڤ ͻ ʻ 㲼 ȡ ʤ餺 ʡ ʤɤˤ ʻ ή ФȤ ? ޤ ʤ 㲼 αƶ Ψ ü ޤꡢ Ф о Ū ڥ ȯ ޤ ͻ ܤˤʤ С Ȥʤ ޤ ľ С פˤʤ ޤ о ϡ ϥ ȸƤФ Ƥ ޤ Ǥ
Ȥϸ 줿 ͻ Ͽ ޤ ʬ Ȥ ʧ Ȥ ä ? S&P ˤĤ ơ Ϥ ϸ